What It Is
Aviation · Corporate Restructuring · Malaysia · Singapore · Comparison BriefTratopedia · 23 Aug 2026
Two low-cost airlines, one pandemic, and the difference a shareholder makes
Thirty-Seven Aircraft
AirAsia and Scoot are both low-cost carriers, both based in Southeast Asia, both flying out of the same pandemic. One of them met it with a parent that could write a cheque; the other met it by asking its creditors to accept half a cent in the ringgit. Six years later the consequences are still on the apron: at the end of the first quarter of 2026 AirAsia had 240 aircraft and 203 of them in operation. Scoot had 63, and flew them.
What is established, and how firmly Sorted by standing. Company releases and exchange filings first; the one thing nobody has explained, last.
- 37AirAsia aircraft not in operation at the end of Q1 2026, of 240
- 0.5%of RM33.65bn is what AirAsia X’s creditors were paid
- S$15.4bnraised by Singapore Airlines from 1 April 2020
- RM6.8bnthe price of moving the airlines onto one listed company
- 6 yearsfrom PN17 classification to PN17 exit
| Standing | What is established | Where it comes from |
|---|---|---|
| Confirmed | AirAsia Group closed Q1 2026 with 240 aircraft, 203 of them in operation, carrying about 18.9 million passengers on 22.1 million seats at an 85% load factor, with capacity back to 98% of pre-pandemic. | AirAsia operating statistics, 10 Apr 2026 |
| Confirmed | Scoot operated 63 passenger aircraft at 31 March 2026 — 13 787-8, 11 787-9, 6 A320ceo, 12 A320neo, 12 A321neo, 9 E190-E2. Of the group’s 134 destinations, 57 were flown by Scoot alone. | Singapore Airlines FY2025/26 results, 14 May 2026 |
| Confirmed | AirAsia X’s creditors were paid 0.5% of RM33.65bn in admitted claims — about RM168m. They approved it on 12 November 2021 and the High Court sanctioned it on 16 December 2021. Half the admitted debt was owed to Airbus for cancelled orders. | ch-aviation; The Edge Malaysia |
| Confirmed | Singapore Airlines raised S$15.4bn from 1 April 2020, beginning with S$5.3bn in new equity and up to S$9.7bn in mandatory convertible bonds underwritten by Temasek, its 55% shareholder. | Singapore Airlines announcements, 26 Mar 2020 and 19 May 2021 |
| Confirmed | Capital A sold its airlines to AirAsia X for RM6.8bn — RM3.0bn for the regional operations and RM3.8bn for the Malaysian one, settled by the buyer assuming debt. Pro forma, equity turns from −RM8.8bn to +RM649m. Shareholders approved on 14 October 2024, 99.97% in favour; the deal completed on 18 January 2026. | The Edge Malaysia; AirAsia announcement, 18 Jan 2026 |
| Confirmed | Capital A was classified PN17 in January 2022 and left it at 9am on 20 May 2026, after a High Court-approved capital reduction of about RM5.5bn. AirAsia X began trading as AirAsia Group Berhad on 14 July 2026. | The Star; New Straits Times; Bursa Malaysia |
| Confirmed | Both groups reported on 14 May 2026. SIA posted record revenue of S$20,522m and operating profit of S$2,375m, up 39.0%. AirAsia posted EBITDA of RM1,009m and a net loss of RM129m after RM232m of non-cash currency losses, and announced a 10% capacity cut with 21 routes suspended. | Both companies’ own results releases |
| Unconfirmed | Why 37 AirAsia aircraft were not in operation. The company publishes the count and gives no cause. The Pratt & Whitney engine recall is the obvious candidate and nothing in the record connects the two. | Absent from the company’s releases |
| Not public | Scoot’s own profit or loss. Singapore Airlines reports at group level, so every profitability statement about Scoot here is a statement about the group that owns it. | Not disclosed separately |
Timeline
Six years, two paths Every dated item. The one thing that carries no date is below the table.
- 26 Mar 2020Singapore Airlines announces S$5.3bn in new equity and up to S$9.7bn in mandatory convertible bonds, underwritten by Temasek. It is the decision that makes everything after it different.
- 12 Nov 2021AirAsia X’s creditors vote for the scheme — Class A 100%, Class B 97.6%, Class C 100%.
- 16 Dec 2021The High Court sanctions it under section 366 of the Companies Act 2016. Creditors will receive 0.5%.
- Jan 2022Capital A — the group holding the short-haul airlines — is classified PN17, Bursa Malaysia’s register of financially distressed listed companies.
- 14 Oct 2024Capital A’s shareholders approve the RM6.8bn sale of the airlines to AirAsia X, 99.97% in favour.
- 1 Apr 2025Changi’s increased transfer and transit charges begin, funding a S$3bn upgrade.
- 17 Jun 2025Skytrax names AirAsia the world’s best low-cost airline for the sixteenth consecutive year, and Scoot the world’s best long-haul low-cost airline, second overall.
- Jul 2025AirAsia signs for 50 A321XLRs with options for 20 more, worth US$12.25bn, in Paris during a Malaysian state visit. Deliveries run 2028 to 2032.
- 31 Jul 2025Jetstar Asia ceases operations after 21 years at Changi. Qantas cites supplier costs up by as much as 200%, high airport fees and regional competition.
- 18 Jan 2026AirAsia X completes the acquisition: 2,307,692,307 new shares issued and RM3.8bn of debt assumed. The new shares list the following day.
- 6 Mar 2026AirAsia’s fuel surcharges and fare increases take effect. Jet fuel passes US$200 a barrel later that month.
- 6 May 2026AirAsia orders 150 A220s with the same engine family that grounded much of the world’s narrowbody fleet, plus a twelve-year maintenance agreement.
- 14 May 2026Both groups report. SIA: record revenue and a 39% rise in operating profit. AirAsia: a quarterly net loss and a 10% capacity cut for the quarter ahead.
- 20 May 2026Capital A leaves PN17 at 9am, ending six years of restructuring.
- 14 Jul 2026AirAsia X trades as AirAsia Group Berhad. Every AirAsia-branded airline is now under one listed company, and the non-aviation businesses are under another.
One thing here has a size but no date. Every other item on this page can be placed: a vote, a court order, a results release, a trading name. The thirty-seven aircraft cannot. AirAsia publishes the count each quarter and has never published a reason, a start or an expected end — so there is no way to say when they stopped flying, and no way to say when they will resume. A reader wanting to know how far the recovery has left to run is looking at the one number in the set that the chronology cannot hold.
- 37counted, uncaused
- 98%of pre-pandemic capacity, restored
The Argument
The balance sheet flew the aircraft What the record supports, and what complicates it.
Both airlines are good at being cheap. Skytrax’s passenger vote, taken worldwide between September 2024 and May 2025, put AirAsia first among low-cost carriers for the sixteenth consecutive year and Scoot second, with Scoot first in the long-haul category. On the thing a low-cost airline is for, they are the two best-regarded in the world, and one is not obviously beating the other.
What differs is the shareholder. In March 2020 Singapore Airlines could announce a S$15.0bn package because Temasek, holding 55% of it, would underwrite whatever the market did not take; by May 2021 the group had raised S$15.4bn. AirAsia X had no such shareholder, and its route through the same months ran through a Malaysian court: creditors admitted to RM33.65bn of claims received 0.5% of them, roughly RM168m, and half of what was written off was owed to Airbus for orders that would not now be taken. Capital A, which held the short-haul airlines, spent the next four years classified as financially distressed and only escaped by selling those airlines to its own long-haul affiliate for RM6.8bn — a transaction whose purpose was, on the pro forma numbers, to turn shareholders’ equity from −RM8.8bn to +RM649m.
The two paths have not converged. On 14 May 2026 both reported, into the same fuel shock: jet fuel had passed US$200 a barrel and Singapore Airlines called it “the Group’s single-largest expenditure item”, saying plainly that its fare rises “do not fully offset” the increase. SIA absorbed it and still posted a record S$2,375m operating profit. AirAsia raised fares on 6 March, took an extra RM200m on its Malaysian fuel bill anyway, reported a quarterly net loss of RM129m, and announced it would fly 10% less in the quarter ahead, suspending 21 routes. Same shock, same week, two different things to do about it.
- 55%Temasek’s holding in Singapore Airlines
- 0.5%what AirAsia X’s creditors received instead
- 10%of capacity AirAsia cut for Q2 2026
What the write-down bought, and what it cost
It bought survival, and on the group’s own terms it worked: the airlines are consolidated, the distressed classification is gone, and the first quarter under one company carried 18.9 million passengers with capacity at 98% of 2019. What it cost is harder to see on a balance sheet. Creditors who accepted half a cent in the ringgit in 2021 are the same suppliers, lessors and manufacturers an airline needs on ordinary terms afterwards, and the largest of them was Airbus — from whom AirAsia has since ordered 50 A321XLRs and 150 A220s.
The argument this page does not make
That AirAsia’s complaint volume was caused by grounded aircraft. It is the obvious story and no source supports it. Malaysia’s regulator recorded 2,613 complaints in the second half of 2024, of which Malaysia Airlines drew 921 and AirAsia 611; the report gives no causes at all, and the airline with the most complaints is not the one with the grounding problem. Absolute complaint counts also track passenger volume, which is why the same report shows 99% of them resolved and 37% resolved in the passenger’s favour.
What Others Add
Four things that are true of both, or of neither Depth from sources that are not about either airline’s recovery.
The engines
A recall that grounded a third of a global fleet
- Contaminated powder metal in high-pressure turbine and compressor disks forced accelerated inspection of Pratt & Whitney’s geared turbofan.
- At 1 April 2024, 637 aircraft were out of service — about a third of the global fleet using the engine.
- This is context, not an explanation: nothing published links it to AirAsia’s own thirty-seven. AirAsia has since ordered 150 aircraft with the same engine family.
The register
What a complaint count measures, and what it does not
- July to December 2024: 2,613 complaints, up 34% on the same half of 2023. Malaysia Airlines 921, AirAsia 611, Batik Air 437.
- Cancellations, delays and rescheduling were 53% of the total.
- 99% were resolved, and in 37% the airline reversed its original decision. A register counts contacts, not quality — which is how the same airline can top it and top a worldwide passenger vote in the same period.
The hub
Singapore is expensive, and it is getting more so on a published schedule
- The departing passenger service and security fee holds at S$46.40 until 31 March 2027, then rises to S$58.40 by April 2030 — up 25.9%. The transfer fee triples, from S$6 to S$18.
- A sustainable aviation fuel levy of S$1 to S$41.60 by distance and cabin has been deferred to tickets sold from 1 October 2026, for flights departing from 1 January 2027.
- Jetstar Asia closed at Changi on 31 July 2025 after 21 years, profitable in six of them. Qantas named supplier costs up by as much as 200% and high airport fees. Whether the same pressure reaches Scoot is our inference, not a finding — Qantas does not mention it.
Governance
A settled matter that predates all of this
- On 31 January 2020, courts in France, the UK and the US approved a deferred prosecution agreement with Airbus carrying a combined penalty of about US$3.96bn.
- Its first count concerns Malaysia: US$50m paid and a further US$55m offered but not paid to directors or employees of AirAsia and AirAsia X, as sponsorship of a sports team owned by two AirAsia executives, to reward the securing of orders for about 180 aircraft.
- AirAsia rejected the implications publicly on 1 February 2020. The court record names a sports team and not which one. This is context for how the group is governed; it resolved before the pandemic and is not a cause of anything in the recovery.
Conclusion
Which one is for you Not which is better. They are the two best-rated low-cost carriers in the world and they are good at different things.
AirAsia
For the traveller who wants to go almost anywhere in Southeast Asia, cheaply
- Best at reach and price. Six operating certificates across Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines and Cambodia, 240 aircraft, and a passenger vote that has put it first among the world’s low-cost carriers sixteen years running. It carried 18.9 million people in a single quarter.
- The trade-off is schedule stability. Thirty-seven of its aircraft were not flying at the last count, it cut 10% of capacity and suspended 21 routes for the quarter after fuel spiked, and cancellations, delays and rescheduling are the largest category in its home regulator’s complaint register.
- Suits flexible trips, multi-country itineraries, and anyone whose plan can absorb a change.
Scoot
For the traveller who is connecting, or going a long way, and wants it to hold
- Best at long-haul and connections. Skytrax’s best long-haul low-cost airline in the world for 2025, with 24 widebodies among 63 aircraft, one terminal to connect through, and a parent whose results absorbed a doubling of the fuel price without cutting the schedule.
- It also goes places its parent does not. Of the group’s 134 destinations, 57 are flown by Scoot alone — it is the network’s edge, not a cheaper version of the middle.
- The trade-off is reach and cost base. Sixty-three aircraft against 240, everything through one expensive hub whose charges rise on a published schedule, and no meaningful domestic market behind it.
- Suits a fixed date, a connection you cannot miss, and long sectors where a widebody matters.
What to hold loosely
Scoot’s standalone result is not published, so every statement here about its profitability is really about Singapore Airlines. The cause of AirAsia’s thirty-seven grounded aircraft is not published either, and this page declines to guess it. Whether Changi’s rising charges reach Scoot the way Qantas said they reached Jetstar Asia is our inference and nobody else’s. And the fuel shock that shaped both sets of results was still developing when they were published in May 2026 — the capacity AirAsia said it would cut has not yet been reported as cut.
The thing worth carrying away
Low-cost flying is usually explained by unit cost — seat density, turnaround times, ancillary revenue. Two of the best in the world at all of that met the same pandemic and the same fuel spike, and the thing that decided how each came out was who was standing behind the balance sheet when the money ran out. That is not a fact about airlines. It is a fact about who owns them.