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BackCryptographic Weakness Discovery — Reading Anthropic Against Its Own Papers
Anthropic's Claude Mythos Preview produced two published cryptanalytic advances: a faster key-recovery attack on the HAWK post-quantum signature, and a claimed 200–800× speedup on 7-round AES-128 — though the paper's own balanced-complexity metric puts that AES gain at 2.7 bits.
Cryptography · Research brief
Read the Papers, Not Just the Post
Two real, published cryptanalytic advances — and in each paper a second, less flattering number that Anthropic's blog post does not carry.
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What Happened
The two results, and a benchmark
Neither threatens a deployed system
- 200–800×AES-128 (7 rounds) speed-up Anthropic's post quotes — at a still-impractical data cost
- 2.7bits — the same paper's own balanced-complexity gain over the 2013 baseline
- 2^108 / 2^182HAWK-512 / HAWK-1024 key-recovery cost in gates, down from 2^150 / 2^288 under the specification's own model
- 85.7%CryptanalysisBench Tier-1 score for the model behind both attacks — highest of five models tested
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What happened · the HAWK paper
An improved key-recovery attack on HAWK
Straznickas & Weis · 25 Jul 2026
The method
Key recovery reduces to poly(n) calls to an SVP oracle in dimension n/2+1, via a previously unused lattice automorphism.
The cost
HAWK-512 / HAWK-1024 fall from 2^150 / 2^288 to at most 2^108 / 2^182 gates, under the specification's own model.
The demonstration
The released code recovered two HAWK-256 test keys end-to-end — a 592-byte decoded key, not the original 96-byte secret seed, and only against HAWK-256.
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What happened · the AES paper
One of nine guessed key bytes removed
Nasr & Carlini · 28 Jul 2026 · building on Derbez, Fouque & Jean's 2013 attack on 7-round AES-128
- 2^99Time of the 2013 baseline, at 2^105 chosen plaintexts
- 2^89.3–2^91.4Runtime now, at the same 2^105 data budget — the basis of the 200–800× figure
- 2.7bits — the gain under the balanced metric max(D,T,M) (2.1 without one fingerprint assumption)
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What happened · CryptanalysisBench
A benchmark on which the same model leads four rivals
Built with academics at ETH Zurich, Tel Aviv University, the University of Haifa and TU Berlin
- 85.7%Mythos 5 on 49 known-broken schemes
- 8.9%Mythos 5 on 142 full-strength schemes with no known break
- The highest of the five models tested, on both.
- Every Tier-1 scheme already has a published break, so a genuine-looking win “does not by itself establish independent rediscovery”, its own authors caution.
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Timeline
From a 2013 baseline to the announcement
Dated events only
- 2013Derbez, Fouque & Jean publish the previous-best 7-round AES-128 attack: 2^105 chosen plaintexts, 2^99 time.
- 2022HAWK is first proposed and later enters NIST's post-quantum digital-signature standardization process.
- May 2026NIST advances HAWK — one of nine candidates, and the only lattice-based one — to the third round of that process.
- Jun 2026Anthropic notifies HAWK's authors of the Mythos Preview result ahead of publication.
- 20 Jul 2026CryptanalysisBench is first posted to arXiv.
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Timeline
Announcement day, and the month after
- 28 Jul 2026Anthropic publishes its blog post and both technical papers; HAWK co-author Stephen Weis posts the announcement to the NIST pqc-forum mailing list the same day, and NIST cryptographer Daniel Apon reportedly replies within hours confirming the HAWK result independently.
- 29 Jul 2026Anthropic edits its blog post (“updated an academic affiliation”); a revised CryptanalysisBench (v2) is posted; an independent analysis of both papers is published on PostQuantum.com.
- 28 Aug 2026As of this date, the public record does not show whether NIST or HAWK's submitters have changed the scheme's parameters or its standing in the standardization process.
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The Argument
What Anthropic's post says
The headline framing
HAWK
“effectively cutting its key strength in half”; HAWK-256's expected work factor falls from 2^64 to 2^38.
AES
Mythos improved the speed of the previous best attacks by “200-800×.”
Both are real
The 2^38 and the 200-800× figures each match a number the papers themselves compute.
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The Argument
What the papers' own tables say
A second, less flattering number
HAWK-256, Table 1
Under the gate-count model the HAWK specification relies on, the spec-side figure is 2^74, not 2^64; under Core-SVP it is 2^62. The pairing “2^64” does not appear in the table at all.
AES, balanced metric
200-800× holds only with data fixed at 2^105, itself still impractical. Under the balanced metric max(D,T,M), the gain over the 2013 baseline is 2.7 bits (2.1 without one fingerprint assumption).
In the AES paper's own words
“the overall complexity of our attack has not improved” — under the fixed-data framing alone.
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The Argument
Headline against table, side by side
Same result, two numbers
Claim Anthropic's post The paper's own table HAWK-256 work factor 2^64 → 2^38 2^74 → 2^52 (gate model) / 2^62 → 2^38 (Core-SVP) AES-128 (7 rounds) speed-up 200–800× 2.7 bits (2.1 without one fingerprint assumption), balanced metric max(D,T,M) HAWK-512 / HAWK-1024 key strength “cut in half” 2^150 → 2^108 (42 bits) / 2^288 → 2^182 (106 bits) Cryptographic weakness discovery10 / 17
The Argument
None of this makes Anthropic's post false
Marin Ivezic, independent security consultant
“the blog is a summary; the paper is the citable source, and the secondary coverage has been copying the blog.”
Which document you read
The two attacks are real, published, and reviewable; the number a reader remembers depends on which document they read.
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What Others Add
Three outside readings
The Hacker News · A candidate doing its job
HAWK is the only lattice-based scheme among the nine NIST advanced to the third round. A 2025 paper by van Gent & Pulles showed a hypothetical automorphism would open this path, but its authors said it did not then threaten HAWK; Mythos found the missing automorphism.
PostQuantum.com · The process worked
Marin Ivezic notes Anthropic notified HAWK's team in June, posted to the NIST forum on publication day, and got a same-day independent check from a NIST cryptographer — disclosure norms followed.
The AES paper's acknowledgements · Six names, comments only
Nasr & Carlini thank six cryptographers, including Adi Shamir, only for “comments on an early draft” — no endorsement, no review, no verification.
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What Others Add · PostQuantum.com
Marin Ivezic's guidance for security teams
Leave alone
Standardized-algorithm roadmaps — ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, Falcon. None is affected.
Inventory instead
Any proprietary or vendor-specific cryptography — the population these results actually bear on.
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What Others Add
The verification bottleneck
The papers' own authors raise it
- Tens of hoursof model time for the core AES idea
- Hundreds of hoursof the authors' own validation
- Nasr & Carlini call the arrangement — humans mainly checking a model's output rather than producing it — something that “feels uncomfortable.”
- Ivezic calls that ratio, not either specific break, “the thing I would put on a watch list”, and cites Markku-Juhani Saarinen's proposal that AI-assisted cryptanalysis should always ship machine-checkable proofs or scaled-down demonstrations.
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What Others Add
What stays true regardless
The boundaries both sides agree on
HAWK
A candidate, not a deployed standard. The construction does not transfer to Falcon and does not touch ML-KEM, ML-DSA or SLH-DSA.
AES
Full 10-round AES-128 is untouched: the attack targets 7 rounds and still needs an impractical 2^105 chosen plaintexts.
CryptanalysisBench
Roughly 78% of wins across all five models were judged genuine by the paper's own trace analysis — nearly identical across models, not a Mythos-specific figure.
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Conclusion
So what
Real advances, read at the right resolution
What's solid
Two published, reviewable cryptanalytic advances against a not-yet-deployed post-quantum candidate and a reduced-round cipher already impractical at full strength, plus a benchmark on which the same model leads four rivals. No production system needs to change.
What's overstated
The two figures a reader is likeliest to remember — HAWK-256's “2^64 to 2^38” and AES's “200-800×” — are each the most favourable framing available, and each paper states a second, smaller number for the same result that its own announcement does not carry.
What's still open
Whether a model that discovers this fast can be verified this fast is a question the papers' own authors raise about themselves and do not answer. Whether NIST or HAWK's submitters respond by changing the scheme is, as of 28 Aug 2026, not yet shown in the public record either way.
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What to watch
Four things to watch
- Watch whether NIST or HAWK's submitters respond — a parameter change, a withdrawal, or silence through the next standardization update would each say something different.
- Watch whether CryptanalysisBench's Tier-1 lead for Mythos-class models holds at longer time budgets — the paper's own 16-hour run already found most of that gain came from finishing attacks already found, not from new capability.
- Watch whether machine-checkable proofs or scaled-down demonstrations — Saarinen's proposal — become standard practice for AI-assisted cryptanalytic claims generally.
- Watch for any of the six cryptographers thanked in the AES paper's acknowledgements publishing their own assessment of the result, rather than the unquoted “comments” the paper itself reports.
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